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The Public Service 
Employment Program
At various times during the 1970s, public service job pro 
grams were seen by various people as a solution to long term 
unemployment among technologically displaced and/or un 
skilled people, as a strategy to combat short term unemploy 
ment caused by economic downturns, as an alternative to 
welfare, and as a scandal-ridden failure.
The programs were none of these things, yet each view has 
an element of truth. Public service jobs programs could be 
viewed from many different perspectives for two main 
reasons. First, they had multiple objectives, and different 
observers could judge the programs by different criteria. 
Second, the programs were undergoing almost continuous 
change. Information gathered in one year might not apply to 
the program in the following year.
This chapter describes the objectives and design of the 
Public Employment Program (PEP) of 1971 and its suc 
cessor, the Public Service Employment (PSE) components of 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 
(GETA). It begins by sketching the background to these pro 
grams, as set in the 1930s and 1960s.
Background
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), begun in 
1935 as one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's responses to the 
Great Depression, established the precedent of direct federal
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government involvement in countering widespread 
unemployment. At its peak, it employed more than 3 million 
people while more than 9 million were unemployed. It 
distributed an average of $1.4 billion per year until its end in 
1943.'
Partly because WPA set a precedent by involving the 
federal government in efforts to directly reduce unemploy 
ment, it was a controversial program. Its opponents 
castigated it as "leaf raking" and "the dole," but since that 
time many have come to appreciate the amount of produc 
tive output the program supported. 2
Despite its obvious similarities to the public service 
employment programs of the 1970s, WPA differed from 
them in two important respects. First, its primary objective 
was to replace household income lost when a breadwinner 
was laid off. (Unemployment compensation was not provid 
ed nationwide until 1938.) Only one worker in a family could 
hold a WPA job; workers did not receive ordinary wages, 
but were given an amount equal to the difference between 
any other income and what the government determined to be 
their "need." Second, WPA was administered directly by 
the federal government, with a federal administrator in each 
locality, rather than by state or local governments.
Programs of the 1960s
Mobilization for World War II eliminated the unemploy 
ment problem of the depression, and for a decade after the 
war joblessness was not a major issue. The government pro 
vided a year's worth of unemployment compensation to 
returning vetrans; a business boom absorbed civilians 
thrown out of work in defense industries; and the Korean 
War, which began in 1950, ended a mild recession that had 
started in late 1948. The end of the Korean conflict in 1953 
brought a downturn, but it turned out to be brief. 3
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Calls for government efforts to stimulate the economy and 
create jobs began to be heard, however, when a sluggish 
economy from 1957 through 1960 brought persistently high 
unemployment levels. Further impetus for action arose from 
concerns that many people would be thrown out of work by 
the effects of automation resulting from the technological 
advances of the previous two decades.
Soon after the Kennedy administration took office, Con 
gress in 1961 approved the Area Redevelopment Act. It com 
bined loans and other incentives for firms to expand in 
dustrial facilities in economically depressed areas with voca 
tional education programs intended to assure industries of a 
trained workforce in those areas. With a new economic 
downturn in 1961, however, the program proved to be too 
small to create many jobs, and the training component never 
exceeded 12,000 persons through the program's end in 1965.
A much more ambitious effort began in 1962, when the 
Kennedy administration won passage of the Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA). It focused on 
training, especially the retraining of workers whose skills did 
not fit the changing needs of the economy. The largest part 
of the training was done by educational institutions and local 
community agencies; the number of persons receiving such 
training rose from 32,000 in fiscal year 1963 to a peak of 
177,500 in fiscal year 1966. The program also made an effort 
to place unemployed people in jobs with private firms where 
they could receive on-the-job training. The firms were given 
subsidies to cover the extra costs of hiring unskilled workers. 
Private social action organizations received grants to find 
firms that were willing to participate. This portion of the 
MDTA program grew at first, but the Johnson administra 
tion's 1964 declaration of a War on Poverty gave MDTA a 
new focus on the poor rather than the more general mandate 
to meet the training needs of the unskilled and technological 
ly displaced.
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The opening salvo of the war on poverty came with the 
passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This act 
and its subsequent amendments brought about an explosion 
of new training programs, each designed for a particular seg 
ment of the poverty population. Following are the major 
categories of people and the programs designed to help them 
gain skills and jobs:
  Welfare Recipients: One of the nation's most vexing 
problems of the sixties was the growing number of 
households dependent on Aid to Families with Depen 
dent Children (AFDC). In 1962, a two-year experiment 
called the Community Work and Training Program of 
fered work experience to AFDC recipients. This was ex 
panded in 1964 into the Work Experience Program 
(later renamed the Work Experience and Training Pro 
gram). This effort evolved in 1967 into the Work Incen 
tive Program (WIN), with the Department of Health 
and Human Services providing such support services as 
medical care and child day care, and the Department of 
Labor providing training and job placement for women 
receiving AFDC with children above age six.
  Youths: The Job Corps set up residential centers, often 
in rural areas, for young people from inner cities, pro 
viding them with remedial education and job skills 
training. The Neighborhood Youth Corps, which 
operated in the cities where youths lived, provided part- 
time work experience, remedial education, and limited 
job training for high school dropouts and potential 
dropouts.
  Rural Elderly: Operation Mainstream provided work 
experience and income maintenance for workers over 
fifty-five in rural areas, where job opportunities are par 
ticularly scarce.
  Disadvantaged Adults and Out-of-School Youths: The 
New Careers Program was begun in 1966 to train 
paraprofessionals in such public service fields as health,
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education, welfare, neighborhood redevelopment, and 
public safety. It was subsumed and expanded in 1970 by 
the Public Service Careers Program, which added an ef 
fort to facilitate placement and eliminate barriers to 
employment.
The federal government has also made efforts to involve 
private firms in programs to train the unemployed and create 
jobs for them. The Job Opportunities in the Business Sector 
(JOBS) program, started in 1967, was a joint effort of the 
public and private sectors to develop on-the-job training pro 
grams for the disadvantaged. Later, tax credits were offered 
to firms that hired people who were eligible for job training 
programs. Relatively few employers used this tax credit, 
however, and a General Accounting Office study found that 
about 70 percent of the workers for whom tax credits had 
been granted were already employed prior to the credit 
allowance. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 includ 
ed provisions to restrict credits to newly hired employees.
The Public Employment Program
Although the programs of the 1960s were numerous, they 
did not involve the federal government in providing subsidiz 
ed public service jobs. The idea of doing so was considered in 
1969 when recession put an end to the prosperity of the 
previous decade. Congress responded by passing a general 
public employment program in 1970, but President Nixon 
vetoed it. The following year, when the unemployment rate 
reached a peak of 6 percent (a high figure for the time), Con 
gress and the president reached agreement on another bill: 
the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, which authorized 
the Public Employment Program (PEP).
PEP was considered a pilot program, and was intended to 
last only two years. It was, however, a sizable effort to 
counter cyclical unemployment. Funding was $1 billion for 
fiscal year 1972 and $1.25 billion for 1973. At its peak in July 
1972, it provided employment for about 185,000 persons. 4
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In keeping with the Nixon administration's philosophy of 
"New Federalism" that is, increasing the role of state and 
local governments in the operation of social programs that 
had previously been operated primarily by the federal 
government PEP put responsibility for operations in the 
hands of state and local governments. Funds went to states 
and to municipalities or counties serving populations of 
75,000 or more. The bulk of the money was allocated to 
governments in areas with unemployment rates higher than 
4.5 percent; additional money was distributed to areas with 
rates of 6 percent or more.
The federal government imposed very few restrictions on 
the state and local governments receiving funds. They could 
hire anyone who had been out of work for a week or more 
(later changed to two weeks), or who was underemployed. 
Underemployment was defined as working less than full time 
involuntarily, or working full time at wages that provided 
less than a poverty-level income. Preference was to be given 
to Vietnam veterans, youths and older workers, migrants, 
workers who did not speak English, welfare recipients, 
disadvantaged persons, and displaced scientists and 
engineers. Such broad "targeting" amounts to none at all. 
With so few rules, the federal government in effect "put the 
money on the stump and ran," a characterization of many of 
the intergovernmental grant initiatives of this period. This 
approach followed the philosophy of the early New 
Federalism, and was close to the design of the general 
revenue sharing program, passed in 1972. The approach did, 
however, enable participating governments to hire subsidiz 
ed workers quickly, which was a primary goal of the pro 
gram.
State and local governments naturally tended to hire 
workers who fit easily into established workforce patterns. 
Large percentages of participants were white (64 percent), 
male (72 percent), and between the ages of 22 and 44 (64 per 
cent). Forty-three percent had gone to school through 
twelfth grade, and another 31 percent had education after
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high school. 5 PEP participants were better educated and less 
disadvantaged than participants in the more structurally 
oriented programs begun in the sixties, and fewer were 
minorities.
Although the act authorized training, little money was 
spent for this purpose; an estimated 94 percent of the money 
was spent on compensation of participants. 6 The state and 
local governments that directly received PEP funds could 
subcontract to other units of governments, but little of this 
was done. Although data were not collected on this point, 
probably no more than 10 percent of the positions were sub 
contracted, and those were mostly to independent school 
districts.
Start and Growth 
of Public Service Employment
PEP was an addition to the collection of training pro 
grams that preceded it, not a replacement. These older pro 
grams, which had various clienteles and different operating 
organizations, were criticized for being uncoordinated and 
sometimes duplicative. Partly in response to this concern and 
partly in response to the Nixon administration's continued 
support of the concept of New Federalism, Congress in 1973 
passed the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA).
As originally passed, CETA had three main components. 
First, Title I established a formula to distribute money for 
training programs to state and local governments, and gave 
these governments the power to determine what particular 
kinds of programs they would operate. The state or local 
governments that received the funds directly, called "prime 
sponsors," could choose which agencies public or non 
profit would run the training programs. Second, Title II 
established a relatively small public service employment pro 
gram that would operate in areas of "substantial unemploy 
ment," defined as unemployment of 6.5 percent or more.
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The initial appropriation for Title II was $370 million; an ad 
ditional $250 million was allocated to phase out PEP until 
July 1974, when Title II took over. Finally, Title III allowed 
for direct federal operation of some national training pro 
grams aimed at special groups, such as Indians, migrants, 
and youths, and Title IV continued the Job Corps.
Title II was primarily designed to combat structural 
unemployment; the need for a program to alleviate cyclical 
joblessness was not strongly felt in 1973, since the peak of 
unemployment associated with the recession of 1969-71 had 
passed two years earlier. Those eligible for jobs under Title 
II were those who had been unemployed for 30 days or more, 
or were underemployed.
No sooner had programs started operating under Title II 
in the summer of 1974, however, than the nation began to 
suffer another major recession, this one largely brought on 
by sharply rising energy costs associated with the Arab oil 
embargo. Unemployment rose rapidly, eventually reaching a 
peak of 8.7 percent in the spring of 1975. In December 1974, 
Congress reacted to the joblessness problem by passing the 
Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974, 
which added Title VI to CETA. Title VI established a PSE 
program that was explicitly countercyclical. Funds were to 
be given to prime sponsors in all areas. To be eligible for a 
Title VI job, a person had to be unemployed for 30 days, or 
for 15 days if the local unemployment rate was more than 7 
percent. Originally authorized for just 18 months, Title VI 
began with an appropriation of $875 million.
Implementation of Title VI brought rapid growth to the 
PSE program. As of December 1974, about 56,000 people 
were enrolled in Title II. Grants under Title VI went out to 
prime sponsors starting in January 1975, and by the end of 
June 1975 enrollments stood at about 155,000 for Title II 
and 125,000 for Title VI. The total enrollment in public ser 
vice jobs programs (including participants in the PEP pro 
gram's final months) stood at 310,000 in May 1975. 7 Figure
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1-1 shows the changes in enrollment levels in the various pro 
grams and titles over the decade.
The rapid buildup of Title VI enrollments strongly af 
fected the nature of the PSE program in its early months, as 
well as perceptions of it in Congress. The emphasis during 
this period was on hiring participants quickly to combat the 
effects of the recession. As had happened earlier with PEP, 
state and local governments were quickest to hire par 
ticipants with good educational and work backgrounds. As a 
result, the first report on the characteristics of PSE par 
ticipants, based on a sample taken between January and 
March 1975, showed that large proportions were white (66 
percent), male (71 percent), of prime working age (63 percent 
between ages 22 and 44), well educated (76 percent had 12 
years of schooling or more), and not economically disadvan- 
taged (64 percent). 8
These figures made the initial group of PSE participants 
look quite similar to regular employees of state and local 
governments. This perception, in combination with a Labor 
Department paper from 1974 suggesting, in theory, that PSE 
might have the effect of displacing many locally paid 
workers with federally subsidized workers, 9 led many in 
Congress to conclude that such displacement was in fact hap 
pening on a large scale.
This conclusion led to the first of several major 
congressionally-mandated shifts in the design of the PSE 
program. Title VI was due to expire on June 30, 1976. 
Unemployment remained relatively high it averaged 7.7 
percent during 1976 so as that date drew closer there was 
considerable pressure for renewing the title. The Senate, 
however, refused to approve a new Title VI authorization 
until changes were made. A stopgap appropriation in April 
carried Title VI participants on the Title II payroll until new 
legislation could be worked out. On October 1, 1976, Con 
gress passed the Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act, 
providing new funds for Title VI, retroactive to June 30.
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Figure 1-1 
Enrollments in Titles II and VI
and Total PSE, by Quarter 












































































oooo = Title VI Enrollments
**** = Title II Enrollments
S = September, D = December, M = March, j = June
NOTE: PEP enrollments are included in Title II enrollment figures through June 1976.
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The new legislation made two major changes in Title VI:
1. It required that all newly-hired Title VI workers 
beyond the number needed to "sustain" state and 
local governments at their previous level of PSE 
workers be assigned to special projects that would last 
for no more than a year. In effect, the PSE program 
now consisted of two components: "sustainment" 
positions, funded under Title II and part of the Title 
VI appropriation, and "project" positions, funded 
with the rest of the Title VI appropriation.
2. The act also imposed new restrictions on eligibility. 
Half of the vacancies arising under the sustainment 
portion of all the new positions created under the pro 
ject portion were to be filled with people who had 
been unemployed for at least 15 out of the preceding 
20 weeks. The previous rule required no more than 30 
days of unemployment.
The idea behind the "projects" approach was to remove 
PSE employees from the regular operation of the state or 
local government. The one-year projects were supposed to 
consist of specific tasks that would not otherwise be per 
formed. The result, Congress hoped, would be to make 
displacement more difficult. The new eligibility rules were 
intended to target the program on the long term unemployed 
and on low-income people. (The rules also stated that during 
the previous three months, participants had to earn no more 
than 70 percent of the "lower living standard" set by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, people who met the 
unemployment criterion generally also met the income 
criterion.)
Although Title VI was supposed to be the countercyclical 
element of PSE, the 1976 amendments gave it eligibility rules 
more appropriate to a structural program aimed at the long 
term unemployed while leaving Title II, the original struc 
tural element, with rules more appropriate for a counter 
cyclical program. The net effect of the changes, however,
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was to shift the overall PSE program to a greater structural 
emphasis. Even though the amendments allowed prime 
sponsors to fill half of the sustainment vacancies with people 
who met the old eligibility rule, in practice most prime spon 
sors applied the new rule to all new participants. This prac 
tice allowed program operators to shift participants from 
one title to another if funding levels for the two titles chang 
ed substantially, as had happened in 1976 while Title VI was 
temporarily suspended.
The 1977 Buildup
In May 1977, shortly after President Carter took office, 
Congress passed his administration's economic stimulus pro 
gram designed to provide jobs in the midst of continuing 
economic stagnation. An additional $4 billion was pumped 
into PSE for 1977 and 1978, much of it going to Title VI pro 
jects. Enrollment in the two titles rose rapidly, from roughly 
300,000 in May 1977 to a peak of 755,000 in April 1978.
During this period, prime sponsors increased the number 
of PSE positions that were subcontracted to community- 
based organizations. The 1976 amendments to the act recom 
mended that a "substantial" portion of PSE funds be chan 
neled to such groups; the Department of Labor later defined 
"substantial" as one-third of the positions. 10 When the 
Brookings field evaluation team made its first observation in 
July 1977, it found that 10 percent of the sustainment posi 
tions and almost one-fourth of the project positions were 
subcontracted to nonprofit organizations. 11 By the time of 
the second observation in December 1977, when total enroll 
ment stood at 610,000, one-fourth of all participants were 
assigned to work in nonprofit organizations; the proportion 
for "sustainment" positions was 10 percent, and for the 
"project" portion 43 percent. 12
The 1978 Amendments
In October 1978, Congress made further substantial 
changes to the PSE program when it passed new legislation
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reauthorizing CETA. Eligibility rules were again tightened, 
requiring applicants to have been unemployed for 15 weeks 
in the case of Title II or 10 weeks for Title VI (see table 1-1). 
Limits were tightened on the amount PSE workers could be 
paid, and new limits were imposed on the length of time any 
worker could remain in the program. These changes were 
designed to focus the program on the long term unemployed 
and to further limit prime sponsors' ability to displace 
regular workers with PSE workers.
Just as important, Congress required prime sponsors to set 
aside a certain percentage of funds to provide formal train 
ing for PSE participants. Helping state and local govern 
ments provide services was no longer one of the objectives of 
PSE. This goal, in fact, was no longer mentioned in the law. 
Instead, the primary focus was now on training the 
unemployed who had low levels of skills.
As it turned out, 1978 was the beginning of the end for 
PSE. The shift in goals mandated by the congressional 
amendments made local governments less enthusiastic about 
participating in the program, as chapter 2 will explain. Talk 
in the Carter administration of converting PSE into a 
welfare reform program cast further doubt on the ability of 
local officials to meet service goals through PSE; proposed 
was a "Better Jobs and Income Program" that would have 
provided minimum-wage public service jobs to heads of 
households receiving public assistance, and would have been 
administered through prime sponsors by the federal govern 
ment.
Enrollments in PSE dropped by 150,000 between 
September 1978 and August 1979. When the limits on the 
amount of time a person could stay in the program began to 
have an effect in September 1979, program operators began 
to terminate participants and not replace them. This brought 
enrollments down by another 150,000. Funding for PSE 
dropped from $4.1 billion in fiscal year 1979 to $3.2 billion 
in fiscal year 1980.
Table 1-1 













Original CETA Legislation, 1973
Public employment program Title II Title VI
Eligibility
Unemployed or underemployed persons
Training
Up to 15 percent of the funds could be




No limit on wages or local supplements. 
Limit of $10,000 annually in federally 
funded wages.
Participants must (1) reside in an area of 
substantial unemployment and (2) be 
unemployed at least 30 days before 
application, or be underemployed.
No requirement
No limit
Maximum of $10,000 annually to any 
participant. Employers may supplement 
wages with own funds. Labor Department 
may "make general recommendations 
to prime sponsors" in effort to keep 
national average to $7,800.
Unemployed for 30 days (15 days in areas of 
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average of $7,800 per participant.
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The end of PSE came in 1981, when the Reagan ad 
ministration took office. Citing continuing charges of fraud 
and abuse by local governments, the high cost per partici 
pant, and low rates of placement in unsubsidized jobs as 
reported by prime sponsors, the administration persuaded 
Congress to rescind the program's spending authority for 
fiscal year 1981 and to eliminate any authorization for fiscal 
year 1982. As a result, PSE ended on September 30, 1981.
The primary vehicle for job training became the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA), which replaced CETA as 
of October 1, 1983. Unlike CETA, JTPA does not channel 
federal money directly to local governments; instead, funds 
go to each state governor, for allocation within the state. 
Also, JTPA puts a much heavier emphasis than CETA did 
on cooperation with the private sector. (The principal 
mechanism for such interaction under CETA had been Title 
VII.) At the local level, each area's JTPA program is run 
under an agreement between local government and a Private 
Industry Council (PIC), which includes a majority of 
representatives from private business. JTPA programs focus 
on training; they can include little work experience or pay 
ment of stipends to participants. JTPA explicitly prohibits 
public service employment. Finally, JTPA contains a com 
ponent to retrain dislocated workers—that is, experienced 
workers who have lost jobs in declining industries or whose 
skills have become obsolete because of technological ad 
vances. This final aspect of JTPA is quite similar to the em 
phasis in the Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962, where large-scale federal training efforts had their start 
in the postwar era.
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Summary of Legislative Provisions
The Emergency Employment Act (PEP)
Purpose
The act's stated goal was "to provide unemployed and 
underemployed persons with transitional employment in 
jobs providing needed public services during times of high 
unemployment and, wherever feasible, related training and 
manpower services to enable such persons to move into 
employment or training not supported under this act." 13
The legislation suggested "transitional" employment dur 
ing periods of high unemployment that was to lead to unsub- 
sidized jobs. In fact, there was no limit on tenure in the pro 
gram, and during the life of the program the unemployment 
rate never went below the trigger, thus providing continuous 
funding to the program agents.
The program also emphasized "needed public services" 
and allowed the program agents to indicate in their plans 
what these needed public services were.
Eligibility
Eligibility was limited to the "unemployed and 
underemployed." Unemployed meant those who were look 
ing for work. This also came to mean those who had been 
out of the labor force or who were new entrants. 
Underemployed was defined as working part time involun 
tarily or earning below poverty-level wages. As the program 
was implemented, this included persons working at wages 
that put them above the poverty line, but in jobs that were 
below those for which they were qualified.
The legislation also provided for equitable service to 
"significant segments of the population." 14 The significant 
segments included disabled Vietnam veterans and special
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veterans; young people (ages 18 to 22) entering the labor 
force; older persons (45 years of age and older); migrant and 
seasonal farm workers; those with limited English-speaking 
ability; people unemployed because of technological change 
or cutbacks in federal expenditure (particularly defense, 
aerospace, or construction); minority group members; ex- 
offenders; and the physically or mentally handicapped. 
Excluded from participation were employed white males be 
tween the ages of 22 and 45 who were not veterans or in af 
fected industries. There was essentially no targeting in the 
program.
Wages
No restrictions were put on local supplementation of 
wages. There was, however, a limit on federal-funded annual 
wages of $10,000 per year.
Types of Jobs
Program regulations included guidelines for the types of 
jobs that participants could hold. These were defined by 
functional area—that is, the job was defined by the function 
of the agency rather than by the specific occupation. For ex 
ample, a janitor in a school was defined as fulfilling the 
function of education. The approved functional areas were 
law enforcement, education, public works, health, en 
vironmental quality, fire protection, parks and recreation, 
social services, and other. ("Other" turned out to be one of 
the largest categories.) In essence, the suggested types of jobs 
included all the functions of local and state government. 
Thus, there were essentially no limits on the types of jobs in 
to which participants could be placed.
Training
The legislation provided that up to 15 percent of the funds 
could be used for training and supportive services. However, 
the program guidelines reduced this amount and specified 
that it be used only when absolutely necessary.
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CETA Title II
Purpose
The legislative statement of purpose for the original Title 
II was the same as for PEP; it emphasized transitional 
employment and the provision of needed public services.
Eligibility
To be eligible for Title II, a person had to reside in an area 
of substantial unemployment and have been unemployed for 
30 days or be underemployed. Significant segments of the 
population that were to be given equitable treatment were 
the long term unemployed, Vietnam veterans, AFDC reci 
pients, and former employment and training program par 
ticipants.
Types of Jobs
Sponsors were to establish a goal of limiting participation 
in PSE to 12 months. Sponsors were required to pay wages 
comparable to unsubsidized workers in similar jobs. A max 
imum wage of $10,000 was continued, along with an average 
wage of $7,800. There was no limit on the extent to which 
local sponsors could supplement the PSE wage. There were 
also no restrictions on the types of jobs that Title II par 
ticipants could hold.
Training
No less than 90 percent of the funds were to be used for 
wages; the remaining funds were to be used for administra 
tion, training, and supportive services. Given the small 




Same as Title II.
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Eligibility
To be eligible, participants had to have been unemployed 
for at least 30 days or be underemployed. If they lived in an 
area of excess unemployment (having an unemployment rate 
of 7 percent for three consecutive months), they had to have 
been unemployed for 15 days. Special attention was to be 
given to persons who had been unemployed for 15 weeks or 
more, those who had exhausted their unemployment 
benefits, and those who were unemployed but not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. Also to receive special considera 
tion were welfare recipients, veterans, and former employ 
ment and training participants.
Types of Jobs
Employing agencies were required to pay wages com 
parable to prevailing rates for other jobs with the same 
employer. Wages were limited to a maximum of $10,000 per 
year, with a $7,800 national average. With regard to the 
types of jobs that could be held, individuals were to be 
employed in projects with a duration of 12 months or less, 
although there was no limit on the duration of tenure in the 
PSE jobs.
Training and Transition
Ninety percent of the funds were to be used for wages and 
benefits. The remaining 10 percent included administration, 
leaving little for training and support services. Sponsors were 
to place 50 percent of their participants, but this was only a 
goal and waivers were readily accepted.
Title VI Projects
Purpose
To sustain the PSE jobs under Titles II and VI that existed 
as of June 1976 and require that any jobs above that level be 
used in projects of short duration.
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Eligibility
Half of the vacancies in the existing "sustainment" Title 
VI and all additional participants had to meet the new 
eligibility requirements. People filling these vacancies had to 
(1) have a family income in the preceding three months that 
was at or below 70 percent of the BLS lower living standard, 
and (2) be unemployed for 15 weeks or have exhausted their 
unemployment benefits, or be in a family that was receiving 
AFDC benefits. This had the effect of requiring both a 
history of unemployment and low household income, 
though the income requirement was diluted somewhat by 
limiting it to three months prior to application, the same 
period as the unemployment requirement.
Types of Jobs
Participants were to be employed in projects of a one-time 
nature that had a duration of 12 months or less. In addition, 
a "substantial portion" of these jobs were to be in nonprofit 
organizations. 15
Training
Eighty-five percent of the funds were to be used for wages 
and benefits, the rest being used for administration. There 
was no rule that agents set aside any share of the funds for 
training or support services.
Title II-D
Purpose
With the reauthorization of CETA in October 1978, the 
purpose of Title II was amended to include training and 
related services to enable participants to move into unsub- 
sidized employment or training. Title II-D was now to be a 
structural program.
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Eligibility
Eligibility was tightened considerably to require that an in 
dividual be economically disadvantaged and unemployed for 
15 of the prior 20 weeks or be a member of a family that was 
receiving public assistance. "Economically disadvantaged" 
meant a family income less than or equal to 70 percent of the 
BLS lower living standard. Households with a governmen- 
tally supported foster child, a handicapped person, or a pa 
tient or outpatient of a prison, hospital, or community care 
facility could also be considered economically disadvantag 
ed. Preference was to be given to the long term unemployed, 
public assistance recipients, disabled and Vietnam-era 
veterans, persons with limited English-speaking ability, the 
handicapped, women, single parent, displaced homemakers, 
youth, older workers, and individuals with limited education 
(a fairly impressive list).
Types of Jobs
The jobs provided were to be entry level, combined with 
training and support services, and designed to enable par 
ticipants to move into unsubsidized employment. Project 
jobs were not required to be entry level. Tenure in the pro 
gram was limited to 18 months in any five-year period. 16 
Wages were limited to a maximum of $10,000 and an average 
of $7,200, both adjusted by an area wage index within the 
range of 110 percent of the poverty line to 120 percent of the 
maximum wage. No local supplementation of wage levels in 
Title II-D was allowed.
Training
Ten percent of the funds were to be used for training in 
fiscal year 1979, 15 percent in fiscal year 1980, and 20 per 
cent in fiscal year 1981.
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Post-1978 Title VI
Purpose
With the reauthorization of CETA in 1978, Congress tried 
to convert Title VI back to a strictly countercyclical pro 
gram. That title was now to provide "temporary employ 
ment during periods of high unemployment" and funding 
was to be geared to the level of national unemployment, pro 
viding jobs for 20 percent of the unemployed if the national 
unemployment rate was more than 4 percent. If the national 
unemployment rate was in excess of 7 percent, the program 
was to employ 25 percent of the unemployed in excess of 4 
percent of the labor force. Note that the provision of public 
services was no longer a stated purpose of Title VI.
Eligibility
To be eligible, participants had to have been unemployed 
for at least 10 of the preceding 12 weeks, be currently 
unemployed, and be from a family that had an income less 
than or equal to the BLS lower living standard or that was 
receiving public assistance. The same groups were given 
preference as under Title II-D.
Types of Jobs
Half of the jobs were to be entry-level public service jobs. 
The other half were to be in projects with a planned duration 
of 18 months or less. One-third of the funds was to be used 
to support jobs in the nonprofit sector. Wages were limited 
to $10,000. This maximum was adjusted by up to 20 percent, 
based on the wage index for the area. Average wages were to 
be $7,200, again adjusted for the wage index of the area. 
Local supplementation of wages was limited to 10 percent of 
the funds under Title VI or 20 percent of the maximum in the 
case of any individual participant.
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Training
Not less than 10 percent of the funds in fiscal year 1979 
and 5 percent or more of the funds in successive years was to 
be used for training. In addition, sponsors were to prepare 
employability development plans for participants and 
specify in their plans the rates of transition that they hoped 
to achieve.
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